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Own Rules: Administrative Res Judicata
Matt Bove*
L INTRODUCTION
The Illinois Appellate Court recently issued a decision expanding the scope
of administrative res judicata' and collateral estoppel' in Marco v. Doherty.3 The
holding applies the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to administrative
decisions. The application of these doctrines appears to be simple; if the party
before the agency is bound by the decision, then so is the agency. While not a
radical departure from traditional law, the decision affects administrative agencies
which issue a final decision in error, and precludes the correction of the error.
Arguably, the appellate court's decision contradicts the agency's power to modify
its final decision as statutorily granted.
II. BACKGROUND
A. United States Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court made its first major pronouncement about res judicata
in the administrative context in 1966 when it decided United States v. Utah
Construction andMining Co.4 The Atomic Energy Commission contracted with the
Utah Construction Co. to build an assembly and maintenance facility.' The contract
authorized the government's contracting officer to decide any disputes concerning
questions of fact arising out of the contract. Any decisions made by the contracting
*The author is a second year student at Loyola University Chicago School of
Law.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990). "Res judicata" is defined
as "a thing or matter settled by judgement," also referred to as claim preclusion.
Id. at 261. "Collateral estoppel" is defined as "a bar to relitigating an
issue which has been tried between the same parties," also referred to as issue
preclusion.
3 657 N.E.2d 1165 (I11. App. 5 Dist. 1995).
4 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
51Id. at 400.
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officer regarding such facts were final and conclusive pending an appeal to the
Advisory Board of Contract Appeals.6 After the administrative hearing, either the
court of claims or the circuit court could review the decision.7
The Utah Construction Co. filed claims with the contracting officer which
were denied, subsequently the officer's findings and ruling were affirmed by the
Board. Utah Construction filed suit in the Court of Claims for breach of contract.
The Court of Claims conducted a de novo review, disregarding the PPfactual
findings of the Board and basing its decision solely on the contractual terms.'
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the
Court of Claims failed to accept the finality of the Board's factual findings.9
According to the Court, the Board's conclusions of fact were binding on the same
parties that were to litigate the same issue before the court of claims.'" Furthermore,
the Court concluded that collateral estoppel applies to an administrative agency
when it has acted in a "judicial capacity" and has resolved issues of fact properly
before it "which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate.""
In 1986, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of its holding in Utah
Construction when it included state agencies in University of Tennessee v. Elliott. 2
The Court considered whether the decision of a state administrative law judge had
resjudicata effect in federal court. 3 The state administrative law judge determined
that Elliott's discharge from the University of Tennessee was not racially
motivated. 4 Relying on this finding, the federal district court dismissed his
6 Hereinafter, The Board.
'384 U.S. 394,400 (1966).
g Id.
9Id. at 423.
'
01 Id. at 422.
"Id.
12478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986).
13 Id. at 790.
14Id. at 791.
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subsequent Title VII claim."
On review, the Supreme Court relied upon its holding in Utah
Construction and concluded that adhering to administrative findings of fact served
the general principles of collateral estoppel.16 According to the Court, repose serves
the interests of all involved parties by "avoiding repetitive litigation" and
"conserving judicial resources."17 In essence, the Court held that these interests
would be served equally in either the federal or the state context.
Most recently, in Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Solimino8 , the Supreme Court held that Congress may contradict the enforcement
of res judicata in administrative decisions by statutory enactment.'9 The New York
State Division of Human Rights"0 adjudicated an age discrimination claim, finding
no reason to believe that the plaintiff was terminated based on his age. The New
York State Human Rights Appeal Board affirmed. Solimino then sought review in
federal district court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
2
'
The district court was faced with the issue of whether the state
administrative findings had preclusive effect as to the federal claims.
22 Since the
state findings were grounded in the same factual allegations as the federal claims, the
district court gave preclusive effect to the state administrative findings and granted
Astoria's motion for summary judgement. The court of appeals reversed, implying
that the ADEA does not give preclusive effect to state administrative agency
sId. at 792.
16 Id. at 798. The court discussed the full faith & credit clause requirement
that states accord and preclusive effect to agencies fact findings of sister state administrative
agencies. By analogy the Federal Courts should accord similar treatment.
17Id.
"s 501 U.S. 104 (1991).
19Id. at 108.20Hereinafter, the Division.
21 Hereinafter, ADEA.
22 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991).
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findings.23
The Supreme Court criticized the district court's decision, concluding that
judicially unreviewed state administrative findings had no preclusive effect in federal
court.U The Court based its finding on a careful analysis of the intent of the ADEA.
In making this analysis, the Court stated a "losing litigant deserves no rematch after
a defeat fairly suffered."25 According to the Court, there is an assumption of
collateral estoppel and res judicata unless there is a statutory purpose to the
contrary.26 Therefore, the legislature may preclude collateral estoppel and res
judicata by statutory enactment. Under Astoria then, the enactment by the
legislature need not be a clear statement directly addressing the presumption of
preclusion, rather, the statement can be an implied repeal of these doctrines.2
"Although administrative estoppel so favored as a matter of general policy, its
suitability may vary according to the specific context of the rights at stake, the power
of the agency and the relative adequacy of agency procedures."2
B. Illinois Cases
Minois has recognized administrative res judicata and collateral estoppel
in certain circumstances,29 as in Goddare v. Sterling Steel Casting Co., when
"determinations are made for a purpose similar to those of a court" and the
proceedings are "adjudicatory," "judicial" or "quasi-judicial" in nature.3" However,
in Goddare, the necessary identity of issues required for worker's compensation
2 3
1d.
24 1d at 114.
25Id. at 107.
261d. at 108.
27 Id.
2Sld at #109
29 See e.g. Martinez v. Admiral Maint Serv., 510 N.E.2d 1122 (Ill. App. 5
Dist. 1987), leave to appeal denied, 515 N.E.2dl 11 (1987); Colvettv. L. Karp & Sons,
Inc., 570 N.E.2d 611 (Ill. App. I Dist. 1991), Osborne v. Kelly, 565 N.E.2d 1340 (111.
App. 4 Dist. 1991), leave to appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d150 (1991)
30430 N.E.2d 620, 623 (Il. App. 5 Dist. 1981).
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claims to have res judicata effect were not present. The court concluded that the
issues involved in determining eligibility under the worker's compensation statute
differed from those in a private pension agreement." Thus, the determination of
incapacity for worker's compensation could not apply to the plaintiff's private
pension agreement with different standards; therefore, res judicata could not apply.
2
C. Restatement ofJudgements
According to the Restatement of Judgements, courts should apply res
judicata when final administrative adjudications have the same effect as a judgement
of a court"' These administrative proceedings must have the "essential elements of
adjudication." '34 The Restatement defines these essential elements as: (1) adequate
notice to those who are to bound by the decision; (2) the right to present evidence
and legal arguments; (3) issues of law and fact applied to specified parties in specific
circumstances; and, (4) a point of finality specified by the agency, where they enter
a final decision.33
UI. DiscussION AND ANALYSIS
A. Facts of the Case
The Illinois Director of Employment Security made a $7,225.41
assessment against Marco for unpaid unemployment insurance contributions,
penalties, and interest.36 After a hearing, the ALJ issued a recommendation for
reduction of the assessment to $869.69. The Director later issued a final decision,
and Marco did not appeal.
Marco then sought a refund of the balance $6,355.72. The agency
refunded her only $1,520.58, stating that the partial denial of the refund was based
31 Id. at 624.
32 Id.
33 REsTATEMNT (SEcoND) OF JUDGEMENTS § 83(1) (1980).
3Id. at § 83(2).
35 Id.
3'Marco v. Doherty, 657 N.E.2d 1165, 1166 (I1. App. 5 Dist. 1995).
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on a retroactive adjustment of Marco's contribution rate. Originally, the Agency had
computed Marco's contributions at a rate of 0.6% of taxable wages, the rate for
experienced employers. Subsequently, the Agency decided that Marco was not
eligible for this rate, and instead applied a rate of 3.3% of taxable wages."
After a second administrative hearing, the hearing officer affirned the
retroactive rate adjustment, and the Agency adopted his findings and sustained the
partial denial of the refund. Subsequently, Marco appealed to the Madison County
circuit court, pursuant to section 2205 of the Unemployment Insurance Act.3" The
circuit court held that the Agency's initial decision on July'. 9, 1993 was final and
binding on all parties. Consequently, the court concluded that the decision could not
be retroactively modified. Thus, the circuit court reversed the Agency's second
decision, ordered the Department to pay the plaintiff $4,835.14 plus interest, and the
defendants appealed.39
B. Appellate Court's Opinion
The appellate court affirmed the district court's.ruling, holding that the
agency's decision was, in fact, final, conclusive, and binding on all parties. 4' The
court concluded that res judicata and collateral estoppel should apply. This
conclusion appears to be justifiable, nonetheless, the opinion lacks clarity on several
important issues. First, and most importantly, the appellate court failed to address
the possibility of legislative preclusion of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Rather, the court limited its focus to the procedures involved, the finality of the
decision, and the applicability of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Second, the
appellate court failed to address the Agency's argument that estoppel is only
" Id. The unemployment insurance contribution (tax rate) for an employer,
who had not prior employment experience for which it had incurred liability for payment
of contribution, is set by statute at 3.3%. ILCS 405/1500 et seq.
"' [hereinafter, the Act]
'9 657 N.E.2d 1165, 1166 (1l. App. Ct. 1995).401d. at 1168.
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applicable in extraordinary circumstances to prevent the collection of taxes legally
due. Apparently, the court-decided that this was an extraOtdinary circumstance that
would prevent the collection of taxes. Nonetheless, the court failed to articulate this
conclusion in its opinion.
1. Procedure of the hearing
In Marco,. the court properly determined that the Department of
Employment Security acted within a judicial capacity when making its decision. In.
acting within its judicial capacity, the Department apprised Marco of the'hearing,
thus fulfilling the notice requirement The Department was resolving issues ptoperly,
.before it since the Director of Employment Security is authorized 
to collect
unemployment insurance contributions. The Director properly conducted a trial type
hearing.and allowed Marco and the Department to present evidence and make legal
arguments. Further, the hearing dealt with a specific party (Marco) and a specific
situation (contributions for the years of 1986 to 1991). A point of finality was
.specified by the Agency, after a review of the administrative hearings the 
Director
could issue a final decision.
2. Finality of Director's Decision
The complexity of this case and decision arises in the context of whether
the Dir'ector issued a final decision that could not be retroactively modified. The
"administrative hearing resolved issues of fact, and the representative 
made a
recommendationf to ihe Director, who in turn, issued a final decision. The crux of
the problem is a contradiction in application of the statutes governing the Director's
decision.
Section 2204 of the Act states that any decision made by the Director "shall
be final' and conclusive, unless reversed pursuant to Section 2205.1'4 But Section
2205 of the Act provides forjudicial review of the Director's decisions in the circuit
41 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. CH. 820, § 405/2204 (West 1993)..
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court of the county.42 Section 2200 states, however, that if it appears that the
Director has made a final assessment and failed to include all contributions payable
by the employer, he may determine and assess the additional amount.43 This
decision becomes final unless the employer files a written protest of the assessment
and requests a hearing within twenty days of the date of service."' Section 2200
further provides that the Director may amend his determination at any time before
it becomes final. 5
Thus, since Marco did not appeal the Director's final decision, according
to Section 2200, the decision would become final after twenty days.46 Notably, the
section does not specifically state that the Director is bound, but it does state that the
decision is final as applied to the employer.' 7 Therefore, the court should have
looked to the legislative intent of the statute in order to determine whether the
Director should have been bound by her own final decision.
3. Applicability of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
The appellate court failed to address the Supreme Court's holding in
Astoria Federal, which requires an inquiry as to whether the legislature has
precluded the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The argument for
preclusion stems out of Section 2200 of the Act, which allows the Director to amend
the determination and assessment at any time before it becomes final. Thus, even
after the final decision is rendered, the Director may amend her decision. Arguably,
the court should have made an inquiry to determine if the legislature wished to
preclude res judicata and collateral estoppel, therefore binding only the employer
and not the Director.
42 ILL. Coien. STAT. ANN. CH. 820, § 405/2205 (West 1993).
'" ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. CH. 820, § 405/2200 (West 1993).
44Id.
45 Id.
4Id.
47id.
While the court did not directly address the issue of preclusion, it did state
that failure to bind the Director would undermine the usefulness of the administrative
hearing process. For example, if the Department had rendered a final decision, but
later decided that it did not like the result, the Department could amend its decision.
According to the court, this circumvention of finality would offer no incentive to the
plamtiff requesting an administrative hearing because any remedy would be a "mere
illusion" and in essence "a mirage."48 Thus, the court concluded that the final
decision must bind all parties involved in the hearing process.
While the court's articulation seems logical, the failure to address the
possibility of legislative preclusion leaves open the possibility that the legislature
intended finality only to apply to the employer. This would allow retroactive
modification even after the Director has issued the final decision. Thus, the Director
could reassess the amount of the tax in situations where she had made a mistake,
allowing the employer to pay the correct tax.
IV. CONCLUSION
The appellate court's holding in Marco implies that when a party is bound
under an agency decision, then so, too, is the agency. While the court's decision in
Marco may be a logical extension of res judicata and collateral estoppel in
administrative decisions, the important issue of legislative preclusion remains
unaddressed. Most likely, had the court conducted an analysis of the legislative
intent of the Act, it would have still concluded that the Director's decision was final,
conclusive, and binding on the agency as well as the employer. Such an analysis
should have been performed since the legislature could have intended to preclude
the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel as applied to the Department.
4s 657 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ill. App. 5 Dist. 1995).
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